We consider a continuum percolation model consisting of two types of nodes, namely legitimate and eavesdropper nodes, distributed according to independent Poisson point processes (PPPs) in R 2 of intensities λ and λ E respectively. A directed edge from one legitimate node A to another legitimate node B exists provided the strength of the signal transmitted from node A that is received at node B is higher than that received at any eavesdropper node. The strength of the received signal at a node from a legitimate node depends not only on the distance between these nodes, but also on the location of the other legitimate nodes and an interference suppression parameter We show that for any finite intensity λ E of eavesdropper nodes, there exists a critical intensity λ c < ∞ such that for all λ > λ c the graph percolates for sufficiently small values of the interference parameter. Furthermore, for the sub-critical regime, we show that there exists a λ 0 such that for all λ < λ 0 ≤ λ c a suitable graph defined over eavesdropper node connections percolates that precludes percolation in the graphs formed by the legitimate nodes.
We show that for any finite intensity λ E of eavesdropper nodes, there exists a critical intensity λ c < ∞ such that for all λ > λ c the graph percolates for sufficiently small values of the interference parameter. Furthermore, for the sub-critical regime, we
show that there exists a λ 0 such that for all λ < λ 0 ≤ λ c a suitable graph defined over eavesdropper node connections percolates that precludes percolation in the graphs formed by the legitimate nodes.
Introduction and main results
Random geometric graphs have been used extensively to study various properties of wireless communication networks. The nodes of the graph represent the communicating entities that are assumed to be distributed randomly in space, and the edges/connections between nodes reflect the realistic wireless communication links.
With the simplest connection model, two nodes are connected (or have an edge between them) provided they are within a specified cutoff distance from each other [6, 7] .
Another connection model of interest is the protocol model [4] , that incorporates interference emanating from simultaneous transmission by multiple nodes, where two nodes are connected if there is no other node in a specified cut-off area (guard-zone) around the two nodes. Thus a smaller cutoff area results in greater spatial reuse, or more nodes being able to communicate simultaneously. A non guard zone based connection model for wireless communication is the threshold model [4] , where two nodes are connected if the signal-to-noise-ratio (SINR) between them is more than a almost surely, no unbounded connected component exits.
The above secrecy graph model [5, 8, 9] assumes that the signals transmitted from different legitimate nodes do not interfere with each other. In reality, that is difficult to incorporate, since there are large number of legitimate nodes, and all cannot transmit on orthogonal frequency or time slots. To generalize the secrecy graph model, we extend the notion of the secrecy graph using the SINR or threshold model, where two legitimate nodes are connected if the SINR between them is more than the SINR at any other eavesdropper node. We derive two results on the percolation properties for this new SINR based secrecy graph model. The first result is similar in spirit to the one derived by [2] . It states that for any given intensity λ E of the eavesdropper nodes, the secrecy graph percolates for sufficiently large intensity λ of legitimate nodes and all sufficiently small interference suppression parameter γ. The second result is that for a given λ E and γ > 0, if the density of legitimate nodes is below a threshold, then the graph does not percolate. To prove the second result, we use a novel technique of defining a suitable graph over eavesdropper node connections, where percolation in the eavesdropper nodes' graph precludes percolation in the graphs formed by the legitimate nodes. To complete the result we show that for any given λ E and γ > 0, if the density of legitimate nodes is below a threshold, then the defined eavesdropper nodes' graph percolates.
Before we proceed to describe the model in detail and state the main results, we need some notation.
Notation:
The cardinality of set S is denoted by |S|. The complement of set S is denoted byS. A ball of radius r centered at x is denoted by B(x, r). The boundary of a set G ⊂ R 2 is denoted by δG. For a set A ⊂ R 2 , a + A denotes a translation of A with a ∈ R 2 as the center. The Lebesgue measure of a set A ⊂ R 2 is denoted as ν(A).
System Model
We now describe the secure SINR graph (SSG), which generalizes the secrecy graph considered in [5, 8, 9] , by allowing all legitimate nodes to transmit at the same time/frequency and interfere with each other's communication. Let Φ be the set of legitimate nodes, and Φ E be the set of eavesdropper nodes. We assume that the points in Φ and Φ E are distributed according to independent PPPs with intensities λ and λ E , respectively. Let x i , x j ∈ Φ, and e ∈ Φ E . Without loss of generality, we assume an average power constraint of unity (P = 1) at each node in Φ, and noise variance N = 1. Let 0 < γ ≤ 1 be the processing gain of the system (interference suppression parameter), which depends on the orthogonality between codes used by different legitimate nodes during simultaneous transmissions. Then the SINR between x i and x j is
and between x i and e is
Note that the parameter γ is absent in the second SINR formula. This is due to the fact that the code used by the legitimate nodes is not known to the eavesdroppers, hence no processing gain can be obtained at any of the eavesdroppers. Then the maximum rate of reliable communication between x i and x j such that an eavesdropper e gets no knowledge is [11] 
and the maximum rate of communication between x i and x j that is secured from all the eavesdropper nodes of Φ E , We will assume θ = 0 for the rest of the paper, and represent SSG(0) as SSG. The results can be generalized easily for θ > 0. With θ = 0, SSG := {Φ, E}, with edge
Definition 1.2. We define that a node x i can connect to x j (or there is a link/connection between them) if (x i , x j ) ∈ SSG. Definition 1.3. We define that there is a path from node x i ∈ Φ to x j ∈ Φ if there is a connected path from x i to x j in the SSG. A path between x i and x j on SSG is represented as x i → x j . Definition 1.4. The connected component of any node x j ∈ Φ, is defined as C xj := {x k ∈ Φ, x j → x k }, with cardinality |C xj |.
Remark 1.1. Note that because of stationarity of the PPP, the distribution of |C xj | does not depend on j, and hence without loss of generality from here on we consider node x 1 for the purposes of defining connected components. Further we assume without loss of generality that x 1 is at the origin.
In this paper we are interested in studying the percolation properties of the SSG.
In particular, we are interested in finding the minimum value λ c of λ for which the probability of having an unbounded connected component in SSG is greater than zero, as a function of λ E , i.e. λ c := inf{λ : P (|C x1 | = ∞) > 0}. The event {|C x1 | = ∞} is also referred to as percolation on SSG, and we say that percolation happens if P ({|C x1 | = ∞}) > 0, and does not happen if P ({|C x1 | = ∞}) = 0.
Remark 1.2.
Assuming that all legitimate nodes can transmit in orthogonal time/frequency slots, secrecy graph SG was introduced in [5] , where two legitimate nodes are connected if the received signal power between them is more than the received signal power at the nearest eavesdropper, i.e. SG := {Φ, E}, with vertex set Φ, and edge
, ∀ e ∈ Φ E }. Percolation properties of SG were studied in [8, 9] , where in [9] it was shown that if λ < λ E , then there is no percolation, while [8] showed the existence of λ for any fixed λ E for which the SG percolates. The graph structure of SSG is more complicated compared to SG because of the presence of interference power terms corresponding to simultaneously transmitting legitimate nodes, and hence the results of [8, 9] do not apply for SSG.
For example, consider the case of γ = 0, where it is possible that two legitimate nodes x i and x j , with d ij > min e∈ΦE d ie can connect to each other in the SSG, however, x i and x j cannot connect to each other in the SG since
x j is closer to x i than any other eavesdropper node, then x i is connected to x j in SG,
however, that may not be the case in SSG.
Remark 1.3. Without the presence of eavesdropper nodes, percolation on the SINR
graph, where the vertex set is Φ, and edge set
Φ} for some fixed threshold β, has been studied in [1, 2, 10] . The results of [1, 2, 10], however, do not apply for the SSG, since for SSG, β = SINR ie is a random variable that depends on both Φ and Φ E .
Remark 1.4.
Note that we have defined SSG to be a directed graph, and the connected component of x 1 is its out-component, i.e. the set of nodes with which x 1 can communicate secretly. Since
C ed xj is in principle similar to the percolation on out-component, but are not considered in this paper.
Main Results
Theorem 1.1. For the signal attenuation function ℓ(x), such that xℓ(x)dx < ∞,
We show that for small enough γ, there exists a large enough λ for which the SSG percolates with positive probability for any value of λ E . This result is similar in spirit to [1, 2] , where percolation is shown to happen in the SINR graph, where two nodes are connected if the SINR between them is more than a fixed threshold β, (without the secrecy constraint due to eavesdroppers) for small enough γ with finite and unbounded support signal attenuation function, respectively. The major difference between the SSG and SINR graph, is that with SSG the threshold for connection between two nodes (maximum of SINRs received at all eavesdroppers) is a random variable that depends on both the legitimate and eavesdropper density, in contrast the threshold in the SINR graph is a fixed constant.
To prove the result, we consider percolation on another graph SSG e that is a subset of SSG. SSG e is obtained from SSG by replacing the SINR at each eavesdropper node in SSG definition by SINR ie = ℓ(d ie ), i.e. the SINR at each eavesdropper node is replaced by just the signal power received at the eavesdropper node and making the interference power terms equal to zero. Considering this subset SSG e simplifies the percolation analysis significantly. Then to show the percolation on the subset SSG e , we map the continuum percolation of SSG to an appropriate bond percolation on the square lattice, similar to [2] .
For the converse, we have the following Theorem on the lower bound for the critical density λ c .
Theorem 1.2. For every λ
We show that for any γ > 0, there exists small enough λ for which the SSG does not percolate for any value of λ E . In prior work, on secrecy graph with no interference among simultaneously transmitting legitimate nodes, a stronger result was proved that if λ < λ E then the secrecy graph does not percolate [9] using branching process argument on the out-degree distribution. We are only able to show an existential result for the SSG, since finding the out-degree distribution of any node in the SSG is quite challenging and SSG is not amenable to analysis similar to [9] . In this section we are interested in the super-critical regime and want to find an upper bound on λ such that P (|C x1 | = ∞) > 0 for a fixed λ E . Towards that end, we will tie up the percolation on SSG to a bond percolation on square lattice, and show that bond percolation on the square lattice implies percolation in the SSG.
For the super-critical regime, we consider the enhanced graph SSG e , where SSG e := {Φ, E e }, with edge set E e := {(
SSG e , we have considered the interference power at the eavesdropper nodes to be zero. Clearly, SSG e ⊆ SSG, and hence if SSG e percolates, then so does SSG.
We tile R 2 into a square lattice S with side s. Let S ′ = S+ ( and S 2 (a) be the two adjacent squares to a. See Fig. 1 for a pictorial description.
Let {a i } 4 i=1 denote the four vertices of the rectangle S 1 (a) ∪ S 2 (a). Let Y (a) be the smallest square containing ∪ 4 i=1 B(a i , t), where t is such that ℓ(t) < ℓ(
2 .
Definition 2.1. Any edge a of S is defined to be open if
1. there is at least one node of Φ in both the adjacent squares S 1 (a) and S 2 (a),
there are no eavesdropper nodes in Y (a),
3. and for any legitimate node x i ∈ Φ ∩ (S 1 (a) ∪ S 2 (a)), the interference received at any legitimate node
An open edge is pictorially described in Fig. 1 by edge a, where the black dots represent a legitimate node while a cross represents an eavesdropper node.
The next Lemma allows us to tie up the continuum percolation on SSG to the bond percolation on the square lattice, where we show that if an edge a is open, then all legitimate nodes lying in S 1 (a) ∪ S 2 (a) can connect to each other.
Lemma 1. If an edge a of S is open, then any node
Moreover, since there are no eavesdropper nodes in Y (a), the minimum distance between any eavesdropper node from any legitimate node in Φ ∩ (S 1 (a) ∪ S 2 (a)) is at least t. Since t is such Some important properties of S and S ′ which are immediate are as follows.
Lemma 2. If the cardinality of the open component of S containing the origin is
infinite, then |C x1 | = ∞.
Proof: Follows from Lemma 1.
Open edge definition on a square lattice for super-critical regime.
Lemma 3. [3] The open component of S containing the origin is finite if and only if
there is a closed circuit in S ′ surrounding the origin.
Hence, if we can show that the probability that there exists a closed circuit in S ′ surrounding the origin is less than one, then it follows that an unbounded connected component exists in S with non-zero probability. Moreover, having an unbounded connected component in the square lattice S implies that there is an unbounded connected component in SSG from Lemma 1. Next, we find a bound on λ as a function of λ E such that probability of having a closed circuit in S ′ surrounding the origin is less than one. This is a standard approach used for establishing the existence of percolation in discrete graphs.
For an edge a, let A(a) = 1 if Φ ∩ S i (a) = ∅, i = 1, 2, and zero otherwise. Proof: Follows from the fact that in any sequence of n edges of S there are at least n/4 edges such that their adjacent squares S 1 (a e ) ∪ S 2 (a e ) do not overlap. Therefore P (A(a 1 ) = 0, A(a 2 ) = 0, . . . , A(a n ) = 0) ≤ P (∩ e∈O A(a e ) = 0), where O is the set of edges for which their adjacent squares S 1 (a e ) ∪ S 2 (a e ) have no overlap, and |O| = n/4. Since S 1 (a e ) ∪ S 2 (a e ), e ∈ O have no overlap, and events A(a e ) = 0 are independent for a e ∈ O, the result follows.
Lemma 5. [2, Proposition 2] For
, and K is a constant.
Lemma 6. P (C(a 1 ) = 0, C(a 2 ) = 0, . . . , C(a n ) = 0) ≤ p n 3 , for some p 3 independent of n.
Proof: By definition, events C(a i ) and
Consider a circuit P n in S of length n, with a subset P s n ⊂ P n , where
where for any n,
The next Lemma characterizes an upper bound on q for which the probability of having a closed circuit in S surrounding the origin is less than one.
, then the probability of having a closed circuit in S ′ surrounding the origin is less than one.
Proof: For any circuit of length n, there are 4 possible choices of edges for the starting step and thereafter 3 choices for every step, except for last step which is fixed given the rest of choice of edges since the circuit has to terminate at the starting point. Moreover, for a circuit containing the origin, the maximum possible distinct intersections with the x-axis are n. Thus, the number of possible circuits of length n around the origin is less than or equal to 4n3 n−2 . From Lemma 7, we know that the probability of a closed circuit of length n is upper bounded by q n . Thus,
which is less than 1 for q < Depending on the choice of s, p 1 can be made arbitrarily small for large enough legitimate node density λ, and finally depending on the choice of λ, choosing small enough γ, p 2 can be made arbitrarily small. ✷
Proof of Theorem 1.2
In this section, we are interested in the sub-critical regime of percolation, i.e.
obtaining a lower bound on λ c as a function of λ E for which percolation does not happen. We consider the case of γ = 0, where x i and x j are connected in the SSG if
, ∀ e ∈ Φ E .
If we can show that λ c > λ 0 for γ = 0, then since SSG with γ > 0 is contained in SSG with γ = 0, we have that for all γ > 0, λ c > λ 0 . So the lower bound λ 0 for λ c obtained with γ = 0 serves as a universal lower bound on the critical density λ c required for percolation. Let the interference power received at any eavesdropper with respect to signal from x k is I k e := xj∈Φ,j =k ℓ(x j , e).
For the case of γ = 0, we proceed as follows. We tile R 2 into a square lattice M
2 ) be the dual lattice of M obtained by translating each edge of M by (
2 ). For any edge e of M, let S 1 (e) and S 2 (e) be the two adjacent squares to e. See Fig. 2 for a pictorial description. Let T 1 (e) and T 2 (e)
be the smaller squares of side m contained inside S 1 (e) and S 2 (e), respectively, as shown in Fig. 2 , with centers identical to that of S 1 and S 2 .
Definition 3.1. For any edge e of M, we define three indicator variablesÃ(e),B(e),
andC(e) as follows.
1.Ã(e) = 1 if there is at least one eavesdropper node of Φ E in both the adjacent squares T 1 (e) and T 2 (e).
2.B(e) = 1 if there are no legitimate nodes in S 1 (e) and S 2 (e).
3.C(e) = 1 if for any eavesdropper node e ∈ Φ E ∩ (T 1 (e) ∪ T 2 (e)), the interference received from all the legitimate nodes I e := xk∈Φ ℓ(x k , e) ≤ c.
Then an edge e is defined to be open ifD(e) =Ã(e)B(e)C(e) = 1. An open edge is pictorially described in Fig. 2 by a blue edge e, where the black dots represent legitimate nodes while crosses are used to represent eavesdropper nodes. (S 1 (e) ∪ S 2 (e)). Thus, the signal power between x i and x j , is ℓ(
Moreover, the SINR between x i and any eavesdropper node e ∈ (T 1 (e) ∪ T 2 (e)),
1+c , since edge e is open and hence I e ≤ c for any e ∈ (T 1 (e) ∪ T 2 (e). Thus, choosing M large enough, we can have ℓ(d ij ) < SINR ie for any e ∈ (T 1 (e) ∪ T 2 (e)), and hence x i and x j cannot be connected directly in SSG if the straight line between them happens to cross an open edge e of M. The proof is by contradiction. Let there be an infinite connected component in the SSG with probability 1. Then, necessarily
Since M is such that an edge (
and (2) cannot hold simultaneously.
Next, we show that for small enough density of legitimate nodes λ, bond percolation can happen on a square lattice M for large enough M for which an edge (x i , x j ) ∈ SSG cannot cross an open edge e of M. Proof: Similar to the proof in the super-critical regime, we need to show that the probability of having a closed circuit surrounding the origin in M is less than 1.
Towards that end, consider the probability of a closed circuit of length n, P (D(e 1 ) = 0,D(e 2 ) = 0, . . . ,D(e n ) = 0), whereD(e 1 ) =Ã(e 1 )B(e 1 )C(e 1 ). Similar to Lemma 4, P (Ã(e 1 ) = 0,Ã(e 2 ) = 0, . . . ,Ã(e n ) = 0) ≤ r n 1 , where r 1 := r
1/4
A and r A = 1 − (1 − e −λEm ) 2 is the probability that there is no eavesdropper in either T 1 (e) or T 2 (e). Similarly, following Lemma 4, P (B(e 1 ) = 0,B(e 2 ) = 0, . . . ,B(e n ) = 0) ≤ r n 2 , where r 2 := r
B and r B = 1−e −2λM 2 is the probability that there is at least one legitimate node of Φ in S 1 (e) or S 2 (e), P (C(e 1 ) = 0,C(e 2 ) = 0, . . . ,C(e n ) = 0) ≤ r n 3 where r 3 =:= e ( . Moreover, for fixed c, let M be large enough such that for any pair of legitimate nodes x i , x j / ∈ (S 1 (e) ∪ S 2 (e)) for which the straight line between them intersects an open edge e of M, ℓ(d ij ) < SINR ie for any e ∈ (T 1 (e) ∪ T 2 (e)). Now, given c, m, and M , we can choose λ small enough so that r Thus, we have that r s < ǫ as required for an appropriate choice of m, M and λ.
Thus, from Theorem 3.1 and Lemma 10, we have that for small enough legitimate
